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 Echoing a joke that made the rounds in Berlin in 1941, German resistance fighter Edith 
Wolff remarked that “Germany is now called Braunschweig: one half is brown [Braun = Nazi 
uniforms] and the other half is silent [schweig = silence].”1 This paper aims to create a dialogue 
between major authors and their published works through a comparative analysis of the political, 
social, cultural, and economic aspects of 'ordinary' - or civilian - Germans before, during, and 
after WWII and the Holocaust. Reviewed through the theoretical lens of the Intentionalist and 
Functionalist perspectives, this essay will discuss the ordinary German's reactions to the National 
Socialist regime, the prevalence of German anti-Semitism, the legitimacy of collective 
responsibility and collective guilt, and how memory and historical approaches to the discourses 
of the Holocaust influenced German collective identity. This essay will demonstrate the need for 
the integration of Intentionalist and the Functionalist theory to accurately reconstruct the 
contextual framework of the Holocaust. We will begin our discussion with the origins of this 
historiographical debate, and a summary of the Intentionalist, Functionalist, and Synthesis 
theoretical philosophies. 
 The historiographical debate on the origins of the Holocaust as well as most aspects of 
the Third Reich centres around two questions: was it Adolf Hitler's master plan to launch the 
Holocaust? And, did the initiative to execute the Holocaust come from above with orders from 
the Fuhrer or from below within the German bureaucracy? In an effort to answer these questions, 
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two distinct groups of historians emerged: the 'Intentionalists' and the 'Functionalists'. 
Intentionalists believe that Hitler had plans for the Holocaust well before the Nazi regime came 
into power in 1933, and often cite his anti-Semitic statements from as early as 1919 as evidence. 
They believe that Hitler, as the Fuhrer, was personally responsible for encouraging national anti-
Semitism, and that the initiative to kill the entire Jewish people came from him and his 
prominent Nazi members.2  
 The majority of the historians in this field, however, reject the oversimplified reasoning 
of the Intentionalists in favour of the Functionalist perspective. Functionalists claim that the Nazi 
leadership had little to do with initiating the Holocaust, and instead incriminate the lower ranks 
of the German bureaucracy. Also referred to as the 'bottom-up approach,' Functionalists believe 
that it was the rivalry within the unstable Nazi social structure that motivated the Holocaust. 
Hitler, they believe, shied away from decision-making on key issues; instead leaving it to 
subordinates from different agencies to fight it out, with the winner awarded Hitler's approval to 
act on their ideas.3 A variance on the Functionalist interpretation is that it was only after failing to 
expel all of the Jews from Europe that the Nazis resorted to genocide.  
 Regardless of conflicting premises, both the Functionalists and Intentionalists substantiate 
the already established belief that those who executed the 'Final Solution' had little personal 
interest in what they were doing. The distinction becomes apparent in how each group 
categorizes the people involved. Intentionalists view those involved in the Holocaust as Hitler's 
unwilling henchmen under the wrath of their supervisors. Adversely, Functionalists regard them 
as unaware, anonymous cogs within a larger machine being driven by other forces.4 It was not 
                                                     
2 Jürgen Matthäus, “Historiography and the Perpetrators of the Holocaust” in The Historiography of the Holocaust, 
edited by Dan Stone (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 204. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 205. 
until the 1990s that scholarship moved away from the dualism of Intentionalist and Functionalist 
thought to less systematic theory. A number of scholars, including Ian Kershaw and Michael 
Marrus, developed a theory that integrated the Functionalist and Intentionalist schools; for our 
purposes, this theory will be referred to as the “Synthesis Perspective.”  
They suggest that the Holocaust was the result of pressures from above and below, and 
that Hitler lacked a master plan, but was a decisive force behind the Holocaust. To sum up the 
way extreme rhetoric and competition among different Nazi agencies produced extreme policies, 
the term “cumulative radicalisation” is used. Cumulative radicalism, the Synthesis Perspective 
argues, is the result of fanatical bureaucratic underlings putting into practice what they believed 
Hitler would have approved of based on his widely publicized speeches and propaganda. To 
some extent, all the historians discussed in this essay, including Goldhaggen, Meinecke, Arendt, 
Hilberg, Browning, Kühne, and Peukert exhibit both the Intentionalist and Functionalist 
perspectives. 
 Detlev J.K. Peukert's Inside Nazi Germany subscribes to the 'Seduction or Supervision' 
theory of the Functionalist perspective. Seduction theory emphasizes the active, or at best 
passive, consent that the majority of the German population gave to the National Socialist 
regime.5 Supervision theory argues that the system of control, internal policing, and espionage in 
the Third Reich were so efficient that the slightest opposition would likely lead a person to the 
concentration camp.6 While Peukert does not clearly choose one theory or the other in his book, 
other historians would argue that both the National Socialists’ rise to power and the continued 
support they received during the war are more complicated situations than a case of propaganda 
versus fear. Peter Fritzsche suggests that the dire economic circumstances at the end of the 
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Weimar Republic, along with the humiliation of military defeat in WWI, made Germans more 
receptive to the idea of converting to a new set of ideas, and were more willing to accept the use 
of violence to acquire them.7 In contrast to the depression of 1932, there was an 'economic 
miracle' in Germany that would continue from 1936 onward. The fact that this economic boom 
was based on inflation and dependent on the production of military weapons was thought, by 
Peukert, to be ignored by the German population.8 
 This discrepancy between the actual achievements of the Third Reich and the images 
propagated to the public, Peukert argues, is the by-product of the Fuhrer myth. A concept of the 
Intentionalists, the Fuhrer myth bridges the gap between security and a positive outlook on the 
future, and disenchantment with everyday Third Reich life.9 National Socialist ritual and mass 
events, particularly with the appearance of Adolf Hitler, enabled followers to feel a sense of 
belonging and reassurance of their own significance. Associated with the regime's achievements, 
National Socialists were careful to separate Hitler from criticism. So much so, that “If the Fuhrer 
knew about this...” was a standard phrase in Germany society.10 This separation from criticism 
and longing for normality from the German population, which had been shaken by crisis and 
whose social point of reference had been thrown into disarray, is what Intentionalist historians 
believe to have been the appeal of the Fuhrer myth. Even non-monarchist and non-militaristic 
Germans favoured the National Socialist regime over the political confusion and personal 
insecurity of the Weimar period.   
From a psychological approach, Fritzsche also applies this idea to the regime's foreign 
policy. Promoting an ideal German life, Nazis linked the near-death they believe Germany had 
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suffered in 1918 to the need to ruin other nations and sentence people to death.11 The misfortunes 
of individual Germans in the Weimar years were effectively portrayed by National Socialists as 
the misfortunes of the nation, convincing the populace that they had both internal and external 
enemies.12 Intentionalists argue that this manipulation of the Germans' psyche was part of Hitler's 
predetermined master plan to gain consent for the elimination of Europe's Jewish population.   
 Conversely, Fritzsche, as a Functionalist, does not regard Hitler as a central figure in 
German life. Based on the diaries referenced in his book, Life and Death in the Third Reich, 
Fritzsche argues that it was consent offered at the local level that the National Socialist regime 
needed most.13 Fear, opportunism, careerism, and a varying degree of ideological conviction, 
Fritzsche suggests, were the elements needed for basic consent to the regime, and were necessary 
to ensure that the system would function on a day-to-day basis.14 Peukert questions whether 
active consent and sympathy with the goals and actions of the regime are enough to explain why 
National Socialism remained politically unchallenged within Germany.15 Passive consent, he 
argues, rests on a process both fostered and combatted by the Nazi regime, which is retreating to 
the private sphere. With opposing political views now criminalized under National Socialism, a 
large section of the population began to lead a 'double life'.16 In public, people pledged their 
loyalty and met their quotas of economic output, but in private, many pursued non-political 
leisure activities that created minimal interference from local Nazi bureaucrats.17 Aptly described 
by Peukert, life under the National Socialist regime was “[. . .] a state of subservience sweetened 
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by privileges.”18 
 These privileges were most evident in the differing treatment of Jewish and non-Jewish 
Germans by Nazi authorities. Based on the information gathered from surveys completed by 
Jewish survivors of WWII, Eric A. Johnson and Karl-Heinz Reuband are confident in their 
findings on the anti-Semitic atmosphere of Nazi Germany. They suggest that before 1933, most 
Jews enjoyed what they described as 'cordial relations' between themselves and the non-Jews in 
their community.19 Jews that stayed in Germany longer during the war, were more likely to have 
their homes and businesses vandalized, to have been spied on by their German neighbours, 
coworkers, and fellow classmates, and suffered verbal taunts and threats from German 
civilians.20 Johnson and Reuband's evidence indicates that anti-Semitism, before Hitler came to 
power, was either dormant or had not been widespread among the German population.21 This 
supports the Functionalists' theory that the unstable National Socialist social structure is what 
motivated the Holocaust. 
 In his book, Hitler's Willing Executioners, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen discounts Johnson 
and Reuband's collected primary data. He argues that there is no evidence to support the notion 
that the intense and all present public anti-Semitism was the same as people's private beliefs.22 
While discussing truisms perpetuated by other historians in his first chapter, Goldhagen 
denounces the theory that Nazi anti-Semitism was integral to the beliefs of ordinary Germans. 
He writes: “[. . .] evidence exists that anti-Semitism, albeit an anti-Semitism evolving in content 
with the changing times, continued to be an axiom of German culture throughout the nineteenth 
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and twentieth centuries, and that its regnant version in Germany during its Nazi period was but a 
more accentuated, intensified, and elaborated form of an already broadly accepted basic 
model.”23 Goldhagen criticizes historians that fail to specify and analytically separate German 
anti-Semitic dimensions, arguing there are three: the source of the Jews' malefic qualities, the 
latent manifest (described as how preoccupied an anti-Semite is with Jews), and the level or 
intensity of the anti-Semitism as a continuum representing the putative perniciousness of the 
Jew.24 Due to these varying dimensions, some anti-Semitic beliefs become woven into the moral 
order of society, while others do not.  
 One example of anti-Semitic beliefs that permeated German society was Jewish 
economic exclusion. Due to what Functionalist Frank Bajohr describes as 'conspiratorial notions' 
Nazis had towards Jews, the new regime had an immediate effect on the economic well-being of 
German Jews in 1933.25 Previous business partners of Jewish owned companies, either 
voluntarily or under pressure from National Socialist bureaucrats, dropped their contracts, and 
many Jews were forced to close or sell their businesses.26 Competitors took advantage of the 
situation to expand their shares in the market through numerous and often violent boycotts, and 
anti-Semitic propaganda to denounce their Jewish counterparts.27 By 1938, the legally enforced 
“Aryanization” of Jewish businesses brought a swift end to any remaining Jewish enterprises in 
Germany. Before the war, German society determined the social ranking of an individual through 
his possessions, education, and degree of success. With the National Socialists' focus on the 
“racial status” of the individual, the bourgeois code of values had little validity, especially when 
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applied to Jewish entrepreneurs.28  Parallel to Bajohr, Goldhagen argues that Jews are not simply 
evaluated according to a culture's moral principles and norms, but become constitutive of the 
moral order itself. By defining Jews as opposing the fundamental good towards which people 
ought to strive, linguistic, metaphoric, and symbolic integration of Jews into the anti-Semites' 
lives increases the latent manifest of anti-Semitism.29 Regardless of the discrepancies in the 
definition of anti-Semitism, few scholars accept the exaggerated claim that most Germans shared 
the “exterminatory” anti-Semitic sentiment with Nazi leaders.30  
 If most Germans did not share the same exterminatory sentiments of their Nazi leaders, 
then to what extent does Thomas Kühne's statement “[. . .] the murder of the Jews was a German 
crime, not only a Nazi crime” apply to the collective responsibility of 'ordinary' Germans?31 
Following the end of the war, the Nuremberg Trials held only the top-ranking Nazis responsible 
for the crimes committed, and they were convicted on the basis of individual guilt. Transferring 
the responsibility to a limited number of individuals allowed Germans to escape into a discourse 
of victimization. As a result, the Einsatzgruppen (SS) “[. . .] quickly became what Gerald 
Reitlinger called the 'alibi of a nation'.”32 Most Germans, as individuals, insisted on not having 
done anything wrong, including not personally committing murder. In what Kühne describes as a 
coping mechanism, Germans believed there was nothing they could do; seduced by Hitler and 
terrorized by the Gestapo, they were at the mercy of a  
military machine with their own injuries to heal from. In this Intentionalist view, Nazis resemble 
the morally weak predators pursuing war and conquest while ordinary citizens worried about 
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their own lives.33  
 Functionalist historian Jürgen Matthäus, argues however that the “socialization towards 
mass murder involves conscious decisions at every stage.”34 Through unavoidable participation 
on a daily basis, Germans in a variety of roles and in different degrees of commitment were 
complicit in mass crime just as small cogs in a large machine.35 Instilling inclusion through the 
exclusion of others, National Socialism replaced the Judeo-Christian tradition of universal 
humanity and individual responsibility with a morality that revolved around the needs of the 
“Us.”36 Kühne and Benedict Anderson point to the camaraderie that Germans felt through 
harassing, boycotting, and isolating Jews, other non-Aryans, and any other enemies deemed 
“alien” to the community. Encouraged by the Nazi regime after 1933, Germans were seen as 
weak and lacking community spirit if they displayed pity or compassion for “Them.” Many 
Germans avoided contact or severed relations with Jewish neighbours, friends, and colleagues, 
but only a minority participated willingly in collectively violent anti-Semitism.37 Despite these 
considerations, little attention has been given to individual responsibility, motives and interests, 
which is why Functionalists are often criticized for depersonalizing the Holocaust and for 
overemphasizing the 'banality of evil'.38  
 The Synthesis perspective argues that in addition to the empirical evidence of collective 
responsibility, there is also political motivation to refuse the claims of German victimhood. 
Despite the lives, loved ones, and homes lost in consequence of the Allied air raids and the 
Russian invasion, perceiving themselves as victims allowed Germans to admit only collective 
                                                     
33 Fritzsche, Life and Death in the Third Reich, 6. 
34 Matthäus, “Historiography and the Perpetrators of the Holocaust,” 210. 
35 Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, 73. 
36 Kühne, Belonging and Genocide, 164. 
37 Ibid., 167. 
38 Matthäus, “Historiography and the Perpetrators of the Holocaust,” 205. 
responsibility and not collective guilt.39 Dagmar Barnouw reasons that claims of German 
victimization are feared by U.S. administration and Israel because it undermines the familiar 
scenario of Good versus Evil that was established by the Allies as victors in the 'just' WWII.40 
Barnouw expands his theory of feared German victimization to include Jewish-German 
intellectuals, who insist on a permanent uniqueness of Jewish suffering that is beyond all human 
understanding. It is his impression that the Holocaust has become a Zivilreligion, in which the 
correct way to deal with memory stories of Holocaust survivors is absolute empathy and 
unquestioning recording as acts of religious devotion.41 The powerful cultural status of the 
Holocaust as a religious, supra-historical allegory of victimization, Barnouw argues, makes the 
search for historical evidence largely irrelevant.42  
 The expectations of a permanent sameness of German guilt and remorse are, like the 
supra-historical Jewish victim status, also too rigidly defined. The news of the mass murder of 
Jews, and war crimes on the Eastern Front during WWII instigated stereotypes of barbarian and 
power-obsessed German national character that had culminated in Nazi Germany's anti-Semitic 
and master race ideology.43 Memories of German guilt were to become the public memory 
discourses of WWII while memories of German loss were to be excluded from the public 
remembrance, as well as from historical memory.44 For the first six decades after the war, the 
general instability of memories of German losses were hardly seen as an issue since Germans 
were collectively encouraged to focus less on their personal war experiences, and instead 
concentrate on the experiences of their regime and their victims.45 This follows the long-standing 
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argument made at the end of the war, that memories of German war loss would diminish the 
memories of their regime's victims, and alleviate some weight of German guilt with the assertion 
“we suffered too.”46 Younger generations of Germans found it difficult to deal with the 
complexities and contradictions of their parents' past, and this was reason enough to avoid these 
“forbidden topics.”47 Dubbed by Barnouw as the 'children's generation', their individual view of 
Germany's past was that it was as bad as it was abstract. Although Germans are aware of how 
immensely they and their country had violated the basic values of their civilization, many insist 
that their ancestors could not be Nazis. Goldhagen believes it is this denial that cultivated the 
nation's struggle for a collective identity after unification. This enduringly narrow post-Holocaust 
perspective on German guilt and fixation on German remorse, though understandable to 
Barnouw in the first decades following the war, has led to a build-up and increased cultural 
centrality of the Holocaust. 
 Barnouw predicts that memory of Nazi criminality will last for a time, but not forever. 
Moreover, he believes that with new research and changing political interests, the status quo of 
permanent sameness of memory will change as well.48 Like Barnouw, Matthäus insists that the 
more people restrict their analysis of an incriminating act, the greater the risk of severing causal 
and chronological connections with other, less relevant (or less collective) aspects of the past.49 
Through a comparative analysis of the political, social, cultural, and economic aspects of 
'ordinary' Germans before, during, and after WWII and the Holocaust, this paper has created a 
dialogue between the works of Frank Bajohr, Dagmar Barnouw, Peter Fritzsche, Daniel Jonah 
Goldhagen, Marion A. Kaplan, Eric A. Johnson and Karl-Heinz Reuband, Thomas Kühne, 
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Jürgen Matthäus, and Detlev J.K. Peukert. Regardless of conflicting opinions, there can be little 
doubt, Matthäus reasons, that reconstructing the contextual framework of Holocaust perpetration 
is one of the greatest challenges for future historians.50 Therefore, the contextual framework of 
the Holocaust debate requires the integration of Intentionalist and Functionalist thought and the 
use of interdisciplinary approaches. Through the Synthesis Perspective, a better informed, more 
detailed and more nuanced picture of the interrelationship between German perpetrator and 
German survivor perspectives of the Holocaust can be formed.51 
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